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I. Introduction
The evidence on the various barriers to trade--natural and policy related--points to high 'trade costs' which have been invoked to explain several puzzles in macroeconomics (see Obsfeld and Rogoff, 2000) . The growing literature is also struggling to come up with better estimates of these trade costs and, for those that are policy-imposed, which ones are 'actionable', i.e. are welfare-decreasing and could be eliminated or reduced by policy action. Take two examples. The costs associated with cross-border trade between two well-integrated countries, the US and Canada, have been estimated to be as high as 70% (see . 1 Another literature on the patterns of bilateral trade is still to resolve the distance puzzle (why low-income countries do not expand trade in old and new products with partners further away in the recent decades in spite of a decline in transaction costs). 2 'Trade Costs' are usually defined as the sum of administrative barriers, trade policies -tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs) -and transaction costs (transport and insurance costs). Sometimes the literature also refers to behind-the-border (BTB) measures to distinguish those trade costs that are not the result of trade policies. 3 The conclusion of the Uruguay Round has resulted in the tarification of agriculture support measures and the elimination of the MFA, quotas, VERs and traditional other welfare-reducing NTMs (because they reduce welfare, these measures are often called NTBs) are out of the picture. As a result, attention has focused on the extensive array of NTMs and BTB measures which are part of 'trade costs'. NTMs are often defined by what they are not (i.e. as all measures except tariffs-see Box 1) . Some are covered in the WTO agreements, 4 but these are measures for which disciplines are minimal (countries only have to notify changes to the WTO to increase transparency, and many countries do not notify these measures). Most efforts at reducing NTMs have either occurred unilaterally or (mostly) at the regional level and there has been little progress at harmonization at 1 If these estimates seem high, they are confirmed by recent estimates of the 'border effect' based on homogenous products. Using detailed data at the Universal Product code level for 1800 stores for a large retail chain on both sides of the US-Canada border and for close to 40 million products, Gopinath et al. (2009) find that for some products a retail price discontinuity as high as 21% for stores on either side of the border while it is close to zero for stores on the same side of the border. 2 See the discussion and evidence in (Berthelon and Freund, 2008, Carrère et al. (2009) , Disdier and Head, 2008) . Regardless of the magnitude of the 'puzzle', it is surprising that the average distance of trade for low-income countries has fallen significantly over the last thirty years. 3 The terminology 'BTB measure' was first used to distinguish between 'deep' and 'shallow' integration in Regional Integration Agreements, 'deep' integration occurring when integration extends beyond the removal of protection (i.e. integrating factor markets, combining regulatory institutions, harmonizing standards and cooperating intensively on trade facilitation, e.g. reducing 'red tape' for crossing borders). As to BTB measures, they are not covered in WTO but, evidence suggests that they represent significant barriers to trade (all forms of transaction and administrative costs, including transport-related costs). While it is difficult to get an informed appraisal about the relative importance of NTMs vs. BTBs as barriers to trade, there is general agreement that BTBs are increasing in importance and that BTBs are the most important barrier to trade for many small landlocked or isolated economies (see Shepherd and Wilson, 2006, and .
From the point of view of gaining a better understanding of the importance of NTMs and of what to do about them, this paper is a survey that deals with three related questions that should help guide policies towards NTMs:
• Answering the first question helps focus on the NTMs that are binding, i.e. on those that reduce the volume of imports. This is a first step towards identifying that would be considered for policy action if they are found to be non-informative or welfare-reducing. The second, and more difficult issue, is the determination of the NTMs that are likely to be welfare-reducing. The discussion is necessarily general, reflecting the difficulty of detecting which NTMs are welfare-reducing. This leads naturally to a discussion of approaches used to remove NTBs. This paper is complementary to our companion paper (Carrère and de Melo, 2010) which surveys methods and main results on measurement of the effects of NTMs. Section II summarizes the growing number of data bases that are coming on stream and should help developing better diagnosis. Section III reviews the different approaches used to detect the effects of NTMs on trade flows and highlights some of the main results from these studies. Section IV discusses the welfare implications of NTMs using illustrative examples. Section V reviews the alternative approaches to removing NTMs that are identified as welfare-reducing.
II. Data on NTMs
Until recently, the UNCTAD TRAINS-WITS data base was the only extensive data base covering NTMs for a large number of countries. It has given rise to several classifications (see Box 1) but it is dated and quite incomplete and is in the process of being updated. 5 With the growing importance of NTMs as barriers to trade, awareness of the deficiencies of existing data bases has grown and data collection efforts are under way. As explained in the annex, the data base is supposed to cover 165 countries since 1988, but in effect only 100 countries have more or less reliable data for the period [2000] [2001] [2002] . The problem in the data base is that the missing entries at the HS-6 level may either refer to missing data or to no NTM on that tariff line. 6 A joint UNCTAD ITC project is underway to put together a new data base that will include two components: an enhanced official component much like in the current WITS-TRAINS data base but for more measures, and also a subjective component based on detailed interviews for representative samples of exporting companies (about 400 per country). For preliminary results from a sample of 5 pilot countries, see Mimouni et al. (2009) Two main sources of information of aggregate NTMs, both for the period around 2000, are available. One is the TRAINS-WITS data base mentioned above which allows the computation of frequency and coverage ratios subject to the caveats that much of the missing information is difficult to interpret (does no entry at the HS-6 tariff line level mean no NTM or does it represent missing data?). The other is the set of World Bank Overall Trade Restrictiveness Indices (OTRI) also covering a large number of countries. These indices, discussed at greater length in our companion paper also draw on the UNCTAD data base collected around 2000 which is viewed as both deficient (are non-entries missing data or the indication of an absence of an NTM for that particular product-country pair?).
A growing number of more specific new data bases are becoming available. These include a global Anti-dumping data base, a data base on EU standards, the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures -Information Management System (SPS-IMS) and several data bases on trade facilitation measures. Annex 1 gives a short description of these data bases. Table A1 .1 summarizes this information and gives links to access these data.
III. Measuring the effects of NTMs on trade flows:
What Does the Data tell us?
As shown in the annotated bibliography in annex 2, until recently most assessments on NTMs has relied on computing "frequency" and "coverage" ratios, most often using the WITS-TRAINS where the NTMs are entered as binary (zeroone) variables. For well-known reasons these indicators, while a useful description of the landscape, are insufficient to serve as proxies of the effects of these NTMs since these ratios are outcome variables: a low frequency or coverage ratio could represent a very stringent NTM measure.
A more systematic analysis of the effects of NTMs has focused on evaluating their ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs), i.e. on estimating the tariffs that would result in the same reduction in imports as those attributed to the NTMs. The large majority of studies have concentrated on one of two approaches. 7 The first approach uses the gravity model often focusing on the effects of NTMs on the volume of aggregate bilateral trade. For the purpose at hand, which is to 7 Another approach, much less used, relies on price comparisons. It is very demanding because ideally it requires data at the product level (e.g. at the universal product code level as in Gopinath et al. (2009) ). This precludes using the approach for a larger number of countries and products. detect the effects of NTMs at the product level where they are imposed, the gravity model has several drawbacks. First, it works better for aggregate trade than for trade at the product-line level. This makes it ill-suited for the analysis of NTMs which are usually defined at the product-level. Such estimates then need to be carried out at the most disaggregated product level possible. Second, any NTM is usually imposed on imports regardless of their origin while the gravity model seeks to explain bilateral trade volumes making it difficult to identify the effects of NTMs on bilateral trade as shown by the lack of robustness of results to the choice of NTM indicator (see Box 2) .
The second approach draws on the factor-endowment-based theories of trade focusing on the volume of trade at the product level. In that approach, the volume of aggregate trade is correlated with factor endowments, country characteristics, tariffs and various proxies of NTBs. While it has advantages for a study of the effects of NTMs at the product level, it too has drawbacks as idiosyncratic measurement errors, likely to cancel out at the aggregate level, will be magnified at the HS-6 product-line level and relevant control variables are missing. Finally, the estimate of the price elasticity of demand for imports, which is essential for computing the AVE, will likely change in magnitude with the sample period.
Both methods face a 'no-win' situation. Because the NTMs are defined at the product line level, it is desirable to avoid aggregation bias. But working at the HS-6 level is problematic because the NTMs are almost always entered as binary variables and, with 30% of tariff lines having multiple NTMs, the problem of aggregation arises. Also there is much noise in the data with biases introduced by measurement errors difficult to evaluate. Omitted-variable bias will be compounded when attempts to correct for the bias is done by using dummy variables which introduce instability in the econometric estimates because the NTMs are also captured by binary variables.
Subject to the doubtful quality of the data, the survey in our companion paper of the growing number of studies various data bases suggest: (i) NTM restrictiveness estimates based on an aggregate of 'core' NTMs are more restrictive than existing tariffs and, because of their export composition towards agricultural products, these 'core' NTMs limit market-access most for low-income countries; (ii) subject to the included controls, NTM indicators are systematically correlated negatively with bilateral trade volumes; (iii) harmonization of standards is trade enhancing; (iv) for single-NTM products (74% of tariff lines only have one NTM measure) have an AVE of around 40% which is higher than the tariff on the corresponding line; (v) the restrictiveness of technical regulations increases with income per capita.
Case study interviews summarized in our companion paper suggest that NTMs are particularly costly for agricultural products, in part because compliance costs related to certification were usually perceived as high because the necessary infrastructure to carry them out was absent. For exporters to developing countries, arbitrariness in customs procedures and product standards are cited as a major obstacle while for exporters to the EU, US and Japan, the major obstacle is the complexity and level of detail in the trade procedures with Rules of Origin often perceived as a significant barrier.
While useful, it is difficult to generalize from rankings derived from interviews conducted in these case studies. Are those interviewed representative of the universe of firms exporting in a particular sector? Interviewees are likely to refer to different products when they answer the questionnaire? Perceptions may vary according to the knowledge of the person interviewed, or according to the recent experience the person had. Perceptions are also likely to vary across countries in a given sector. Perceptions will also be different in countries with a strong social infrastructure (where meeting SPS and TBT standards will be easier) from those in countries with a weak social infrastructure.
To learn more about the effects of NTMs, not only case studies must complement the econometric estimates, but these studies must go beyond interviews and rely on more systematic in-depth data gathering on compliance costs. This is illustrated in the commodity-chain studies summarized in Box 3. These results confirm that there is no substitute for sector-specific expertise and that it is difficult to interpret the results from perceptions expressed in ordinal rankings in interviews.
IV. Welfare Effects of NTMs
If measuring the effects of NTMs on trade flows is difficult, with the exception of QRs, VERs and minimum prices whose objectives are to protect domestic industries, detecting their welfare effects is even harder because the measures are complex and hence not easily quantifiable. Most importantly, the NTMs typically have several objectives, with protection a potential objective to be detected since it is hidden. Even in the case of distortionary NTBs, i.e. measures that do not address a market failure such as externalities or asymmetric information, a unified approach to measure their impact does not exist. Typically, measurement is in partial equilibrium at the product level. The analysis then attempts to separate out three effects: (i) the regulatory protection effect that provides rents to domestic producers; (ii) the supply-shift effect reflecting increased costs for foreign, and sometimes domestic, suppliers; (iii) a demand-shift effect which takes into account that the regulation may enhance demand with new information or by reducing an externality.
The three following example help illustrate the difficulties at quantification. The first illustrates the difficulty in drawing the welfare implications of SPS measures for agricultural products. The second on standards in electronic products applied by the EU, shows that harmonization of standards increases trade, and is likely to be welfare-increasing. The third, on rules of origin in PTAs illustrates that these measures are prone to capture and hence are likely to be welfare-reducing Suppose a country imposes an SPS measure, and one uses a frequency or coverage measure to approximate the effects of the measure. First, the indicator used for the measure (usually a binary variable) does not capture the potential deterrent effect the measure may have on exporters' pricing and quantity decisions (this is not a problem with a tariff whose objective is just to reduce imports, and perhaps to raise revenue). Second to get the information on the relative value of the affected product, one would want to compute the coverage index on the value of imports that would have occurred in the absence of the measure, which is unobservable. Finally, when one observes the outcome resulting from the adoption of the measure, one is not sure if it is the result of a supply and/or a demand shift (the SPS measure could be informative as consumers learn about the product's characteristics perhaps via required labeling, in which case the demand curve would shift out). It is not surprising then that the results from the bilateral estimates at HS-4 level reported in Box 2 are unstable and sensitive to the choice of indicator of NTM. And even if the results were stable one would have difficulty drawing welfare implications without being informed subject to the SPS: for example, a decrease in imports of a hazardous product following the imposition of an NTM is not welfare reducing as is a reduction in imports following the imposition of a QR, a VER or a tariff.
The effects of product standards on manufactures are also difficult to ascertain since they can have a dual impact on costs. On the one hand they may impose additional costs on exporters who may have to adopt products to the required standards in the importing country. Moreover, a producer wishing to export to several markets may be confronted to idiosyncratic standards specific to each market (in electronics, the EU imposes around 1800 standards, of which two-thirds are international common standards, see Portugal-Perez, Reyes and Wilson, 2009 ). To these costs, must be added certification costs. On the other hand, product standards can reduce the exporter's information costs if they convey information on industrial requirements or consumer tastes in the importing country. PortugalPerez et al. show that internationally-harmonized standards are associated with expanded EU imports of electronics while European standards not harmonized are associated with a lower effect on imports, in some cases a negative effect. Taken together, the results suggest that harmonization of standards increases welfare.
Finally, consider Rules of origin (RoO), necessary to prevent trade-deflection in FTAs, i.e. to prevent imports from entering the zone via the country with the lowest tariff. Even though FTAs are discriminatory in intent, RoO have the legitimate objective of preventing the unwanted extension of preferences to out-of-bloc producers which would erode the value of those preferences to eligible producers (in North-South FTAs, RoO are also sometimes justified on "developmental" grounds as they can help foster the emergence of integrated manufacturing activities in Southern partners).
RoO are notified to the WTO and figure in the NAMA-based WTO inventory of NTMs measures as item F in Part II (Customs and Administrative Entry Procedures). Detailed inventories of RoO used by the EU and US indicate several hundred different RoO defined at the HS-6 level. In North-South FTAs, RoO technical requirements (e.g. the double transformation requirement in the production of clothing) coupled with the regional value content criterion have to be met to qualify for preferential access in the Northern partner's market. The Southern producers are then forced to source relatively inefficient intermediate goods locally or in Northern partners (compared to most price-competitive sources in, say, Asia). Digging into the maze indicates that RoO are more restrictive for products with high preference margins. The RoO also end up reducing the value of preferences (compounding preference erosion in particular for Least Developed Countries). Thus, by design via the bargaining and lobbying power of the Northern firms, RoO have been captured by producers and end up as a way to "export protection" (see Box 4 for details). Clearly, RoO are an NTM whose initial intent was not protection, but which have been captured by protectionist groups and an actionable NTB (see Box 4 for measures that would reduce these costs).
V. Approaches to Eliminating NTMs
Given the difficulty at classifying NTMs, a practical approach is to follow the World and use the four principles required of NTMS by the WTO (i.e. transparency, non discrimination, existence of a scientific basis in the case of SPS measures and absence of better alternatives). 8 This is the approach used in the classification of Table 1 which describes the main characteristics of WTO-verified NTMS. As shown in Carrère and De Melo (2009) where a tally is taken of the frequency of the main NTMs from the UNCTAD TRAINS data base, technical regulations (often in the form of SPS measures) is the most frequently used NTM (probably followed by RoO if only because of the growing number of PTAs around the world).
In Table 1 , the most difficult NTMs to characterize are the technical regulations relating to sanitary measures (for the protection of human beings and animals) and the phytosanitary measures (for the protection of plant health). To be WTOcompatible, SPS measures should be harmonized to the standards guidelines and recommendations of the 'three sisters' (CODEX, IOE, IPPC) with LDCs having S&D treatment. The difficulties involved with SPS are evident from the relatively 8 This is the approach used by ASEAN in their approach at removing NTMs. Using the WTO classification also makes sense if one is looking into the future of the WTS which is more likely to be concerned with marginal adaptation of existing rules than creating or changing drastically existing rules. large number of complaints related to the DSU. 9 Next, whether NTMs are to be dealt with at the national, regional, or multilateral level, a sensible approach would be to classify them further as: -NTMs unnecessary (such as automatic licensing) -NTMs potentially non transparent and discriminatory (RoO) -NTMs that are transparent but discriminatory (selected technical regulations) -NTMs that are transparent and apply to both domestic and imported goods could be retained (unless they are welfare-reducing). Based on this classification, elimination could then proceed in the order classified above, starting with automatic licensing and other unnecessary NTMs, then proceeding with the others.
Two approaches at eliminating NTMS have been pursued: (i) the horizontal approach which identifies priority sectors and then to eliminate NTMs plaguing these sectors; (ii) the vertical approach which would identify the NTMs measures that are most welfare-reducing. The ASEAN approach at eliminating NTMs chose the horizontal approach, identifying 11 priority sectors and classifying the NTMs into Red, Amber and Green boxes according to their restrictiveness, regulatory objectives and WTO consistency (see the discussion on the criteria for identifying priority sectors in World Bank (2008a, pp. 24-6) . Either approach may be adopted but the examples in section 3 show that it is difficult to estimate the welfare effects of NTMs which is necessary whether a horizontal or vertical strategy at NTM is pursued.
Elimination of NTMs can be pursued: (i) at the national level; (ii) at the regional level in the context of an RIA in which the country participates; (iii) Multilateral, as in e.g. the Trade Facilitation negotiations at the WTO.
A. National
When pursued at the national level, there is no concern about delegation of authority to a supra-national level. Since today the vast majority of DCs and LDCs are involved in multiple reciprocal PTAs, the goal should be harmonization and recognition at the regional level so that the RIA is 'deep' and hence welfareenhancing for all members.
B. Regional
To be successful, NTM removal at the regional level requires some delegation of authority to the supra-national level. The case of the EU summarized in Box 5 is the example of the deepest form of NTM removal among sovereign States.
However, other efforts have met with some degree of success. For example, APEC adopted a Trade Facilitation Plan in 1995 aiming to reduce transaction costs for businesses by 5% by 2006. As detailed in World , the ASEAN has implemented a coherent strategy for overcoming NTMs. Even if the elimination of NTMs has been moving more slowly that tariff reduction (partly due to difficult measurement issues), the ASEAN roadmap for integration specifies that NTMs are to be eliminated by 2010 for the ASEAN6, and 2018 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. It is also noteworthy that AFTA which includes ASEAN members has adopted the simplest origin requirement to meet origin (40 regional value content or wholly obtained) for all products, which is significantly less restrictive than the more complex system of RoO adopted by virtually all other PTAs.
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Several ASEAN regional initiatives have been already eliminated some NTMs through the implementation, for instance, of the new ASEAN harmonized tariff nomenclature at the customs level in 2002, the full harmonization to international standards for some TBT dealing with consumer health and safety for 20 priory products in 2003, and for some standards with respect to electrical safety aspects in 2004. ASEAN has also followed the horizontal approach described above.
C. Multilateral
Little progress has been made so far under the Doha Round except for Trade Facilitation. Making trade easier or "Trade Facilitation" (TF) as it has come to be called is an integral part of reforms aimed at reducing trade costs (simplification of trade procedures, harmonization of commercial rules and transparent information and procedures as well as the recourse to new technologies allowing trade promotion and more secure means of payment). Indeed, negotiations on Trade Facilitation are the only item among the Singapore to have been included in the "July package" of 2004 and to attract relative consensus across countries. This consensus is explainable by the sharp rise in intra-industry trade, the rising exchange of intermediate goods, and the verticalization of production in the supply chains that has accompanied the delocalization of activities from developed to developing The TF negotiations which are to deal with articles V ('transit freedom' which is extremely important for LDCs, 16 of the 50 being landlocked), VIII ('fees and formalities Related to the Import and export', i.e. red-tape) and X ('publication and application of rules related to international trade'). A second reason for the consensus in carrying out TF negotiations is that the elimination of the red-tape creates relatively few rents and these measures are not easily subject to capture by officials. In spite of significant fixed costs for LDCs (which could be borne by technical assistance), it is expected that significant market access and increased competitiveness will be achieved by the TF negotiations.
V. Conclusions
Estimates of trade costs are high so the issue is to detect where these trade costs come from. The literature has shown that trade flows are sensitive to both NTMs and BTB measures, some estimates suggesting that BTB measures are higher than NTM measures. Much progress is forthcoming on selected BTB measure via initiatives on Trade Facilitation at the multilateral level. This paper concentrates on NTMs: detecting their effects, and finding out if the reduction in trade flows is welfare reducing.
With the elimination of t bulk of QRs, VERs and other 'traditional' welfarereducing NTMs, the remaining NTMS are technical barriers to trade. Examples in the paper show that it is difficult to detect when these regulations are 'actionable', i.e. welfare reducing because their intent is not easy to detect. This is particularly the case for SPS measures for which is it difficult to ascertain if they have protectionist intent. In the case of Rules of Origin which have the legitimate objective of preventing trade deflection, in practice, they have been captured by protectionist interest groups and are more clearly actionable.
Proceeding forward requires first a classification of NTMs as to their Usefulness, regardless of intent (for example automatic licensing can be removed), then figuring out if they are discriminatory against imports or have a welfare cost in which case they should be removed. The sequencing of removal has varied across countries and depends on the context. Some NTMs can be removed unilaterally but, given that most countries are engaged in RIAs, a regional approach would be preferable since it brings into focus the gains from harmonization across countries. Multilateral approaches are also desirable but more difficult to achieve because countries are hesitant to give up the necessary sovereignty to move forward. Received 19 January 2011 , Revised 21 February 2011 , Accepted 22 February 2011 Table A1 .3. It is this data base that has been used to compute "frequency ratios" or "trade coverage ratios" of NTMs across countries and products (see for instance Bora, Kuwahara and Laird, 2002) . WITS covers theoretically 165 countries (counting European Union as one country) with time span from 1988 to present. However, there are a lot of missing values. In fact, NTM data are actually available for around 100 countries, and not always for recent years. A further difficulty is interpreting the cells with a zero since it may not necessarily reflect the absence of an NTM for the corresponding country/product, but rather missing data. When using WITS data, if possible, one should complement this with data from other sources (as in e.g. Kee et al., 2009 , who complete WITS data with information provided by the WTO's trade policy review and by the EU standard's database).
World Bank Overall Trade Restrictiveness Indices. This data base contains several indices computed by Kee et al. (2009) . It includes an Overall Trade restrictiveness Index (ORTI) (an aggregate of tariff and non-tariff measures).
14 The data base also includes an estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of "core" NTBs at the country/HS6 product categories level. Global Antidumping Database. This database hosts recently collected publicly and freely available detailed data on twenty-five (as of the completion of version 5.0) different national governments' use of the antidumping (AD) trade policy instrument, as well as all WTO members' use of safeguard (SG) measures, Chinaspecific transitional safeguard (CSG) measures, and most of the global users of countervailing duties (CVD) through 2008.
WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures -Information Management System (SPS-IMS).
The SPS-IMS provides access to WTO-related information on food safety and animal and plant health (sanitary and phytosanitary or SPS measures). 15 The system allows users to track and obtain information on SPS measures that Member governments have notified to the WTO, on specific trade concerns raised in the SPS Committee, on documents of the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Committee, and on Member governments' enquiry points and notification authorities.
standards for agricultural products and textiles/clothing over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , and maps them to the Harmonized System. For each product-year combination, counts are given both of the number of standards and of the number of pages of standards. In general, rapid growth is observed both in the number and average length of standards. Survey on EU-US NTBs Within the context of the "Study on Non-Tariff Measures to EU-USA Trade and Investment" financed by the European Commission (and ending in 2010), the ECORYS' team (see details at http://ntb.ecorys.com/) will identify the main NTMs (the final report is still forthcoming), based on "a worldwide business survey". 17 The business survey is used also to estimate the height of the NTMs (i.e. construct NTM indexes at country-pair level). For this reason, the survey is worldwide instead of just EU-US specific. They estimate the height of the NTMs compared to other countries that export to the EU and/or US. Similarly, the business survey collects detailed information on the main barriers to trade, investment and foreign affiliate sales for each sector.
NTMs in WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution)
The UNCTAD Trains database contains information on non-tariff measures following the categories summarized in Table A1 .2 (see the detailed UNCTAD Coding System of Trade Control Measures online http://r0.unctad.org/trains_new/ tcm.shtm). The UNCTAD-TRAINS website also reports information on which countries have submitted information on NTM (and the latest year for which such 17 The online business survey was closed by the end of July 2008 with 5.500 responses received. See http:/ /ntm.ecorys.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40&Itemid=94. Results not publicly available. Sample: 10 Country Studies bases on survey of exporters. Concludes that compliance costs vary across three dimensions: (i) exporters for given NTMs; (ii) across product categories i.e. agriculture vs. manufactures; (iii) and across destinations i.e. the EU and US vs. a developing country like China.
